We present an abstract framework for default reasoning, which includes Theorist, default logic, logic prog~mming, autoe~is~mic logic, non-monotonic modal logics, and certain instances of circumscription as special cases. The framework can be understood as a generalisation of Theorist. The generalisation allows any theory formulated in a monotonic logic to be extended by a defeasible set of assumptions.
Introduction
Until recently, formal logic was concerned mainly with the fo~alisation of universal "truths", such as those of mathematics, which hold without exception and for all time. The logics which have proved useful for this purpose are all monotonic, in the sense that any logical consequence of a set of axioms remains a logical consequence if new axioms are added. Because of the default character of human reasoning, that certain beliefs hold by default if there is no reason to believe the contrary, attempts to apply such monotonic logics to the formalisation of human reasoning have met with limited success. For this reason a number of' "non-monotonic" Iogics 13%40,491 have been developed.
In this paper, we show that many of these logics can be understood as special cases of a single abstract framework, based upon an argumentation-theoretic interpretation of the semantics of logic programming [ 16,171 and its abstractions [ 6, 10, I 1, '271. In this framework, a set of assumptions, formulated in an underlying monotonic logic, is regarded as an acceptable extension of a given theory, unless and until there is reason to believe some contrary set of assumptions. Non-monotonicity arises because the addition of a new sentence to a theory may provide new evidence to the contrary of a previously acceptable default conclusion, which now has to be withdrawn.
We show that the standard semantics associated with most non-monotonic Jogics imposes a further requirement for the acceptability of a set of assumptions, namely that the set attacks every other assumption not in the set. (A set of assumptions attacks an assumption if and only if together with the given theory it implies a sentence contrary to the assumption in the underlying monotonic logic.) The following simple example illustrates informally the way in which various non-monotonic Iogics can be viewed as instances of the same abstract framework.
Example 1.1. Consider the principle that

A person is innocent unless proved guilty.
Its informal English meaning is that if a person is accused of a crime, then the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the accused is guilty, rather than on the defence to show that he is not. The accused is assumed not guilty, by default, unless the contrary can be shown.
The naive representation in classical logic
VX[ -Iguilty( X) -3 innocent(X) ]
fails to capture the default character of the principle. It imposes on the defence the greater burden of explicitly establishing that the accused is not guilty. In general, this will be harder than simply showing there is no proof that he is guilty. In particular, in the commonly occurring case where there is insufficient evidence to prove either that the accused is guilty or that he is not, the default principle gives the accused the benefit of doubt and concludes that he is innocent. In contrast, the representation in classical logic fails to imply any conclusion.
VX[ Gznocent( X) + guifty(X) 1
and therefore treats innocence and guilt equally. The informal principle, however, expresses that innocence, rather than guilt, holds by default. Default reasoning is nonmonotonic, because a conclusion (e.g. that a person is innocent) which is justified in one state of knowledge may not be justified if new knowledge becomes available. Theorist [ 431 employs the "naive representation" of classical logic, but overcomes its deficiencies by extending the theory which includes the given sentence by means of a maximal consistent set of assumptions of the form for all ground (i.e. variable-free) terms, t, of the language. The asymmetric character of the default is captured by not considering extensions with assumptions of the form
+znocent( t)
Because of this selective use of assumptions, the use of the contrapositive in this example does not give rise to unintended consequences.
Like Theorist, circumscription [ 381 also employs the "naive representation" of classical logic and minimises the extension of the predicate guifry (because minimising positive instances is equivalent to maximis~ng negative instances of a predicate). Although Theorist views extensions as syntactic objects and circumscription views them as model-theoretic, the two views are equivalent in many cases. Theorist and circumscription differ in another respect. Theorist is credulous, in that it sanctions holding a conclusion if it is a logical consequence of one maximal consistent extension of the given theory, whereas circumscription is sce~t~c~l, in its sanctioning a conclusion if it holds in all such extensions (more precisely, if it holds in all minimal models). 4
Logic programming can be understood, similarly to Theorist, as extending theories by means of ground negative literals not p representing the assumption that not p holds by default unless its contrary, p, can be shown. Thus the logic programming representation
innocent(X) + not guilty(X)
can be understood as expressing literally that a person is innocent if the person can not be proved guilty; or equivalently, in our framework, as expressing that a person is innocent if the contrary of the ~sumption that the person is not guilty can not be shown. Logic programming considers all ground negative literals as possible assumptions, but prevents the derivation of the contrapositive y + not p ' However, Poole 1441 has also proposed an extension of Theorist, in which credulous reasoning is used for "explanation" and sceptical reasoning for "prediction".
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Of p + not q by employing only modus ponens for the implication symbol, "t". 5 Together with instantiation of universally quantified variables, these two inference rules constitute the underlying monotonic logic upon which logic programming is based. As we shall see later, many different credulous and sceptical semantics for logic programming can be understood in such assumption-based terms. Default logic [49] combines classical logic with domain-specific inference rules. In this example, it might employ the representation
M7guilty( X) innocent(X)
where Mp stands for "p is consistent", i.e. the contrary, up, cannot be shown, where "1" is classical negation. Thus the domain-specific inference rule can be interpreted as expressing that a person can be shown to be innocent if the contrary of the assumption that the person is not guilty cannot be shown. In our framework, this is very similar to the interpretation of the logic programming representation.
Like logic programming, default logic prevents the derivation of the contrapositive of default rules. A domain-specific inference rule of the form 4 can be used to derive q. It does not sanction the "contrapositive inference rule"
P
In our framework, default logic can be understood as non-monotonically adding assumptions of the form Mp to theories formulated in an underlying monotonic logic, which consists of classical logic augmented with domain specific inference rules. We will see later that the standard semantics of default logic can be understood as a credulous semantics in assumption-based terms. Autoepistemic logic [40] and non-monotonic modal logics [ 391, on the other hand, can both be understood as using an expression of the form 'Lp to represent an assumption which holds by default if the contrary, namely p, cannot be shown. "L" is a modal operator, meaning "is believed", is "known" or "can be shown". "1") as in default logic, is classical negation. Thus, in both autoepistemic and nonmonotonic modal logic, the example can be represented in the form6
Both logics allow the derivation of the contrapositive of an implication of the form 'G + P.
In our example, the contrapositive means that if a person is not innocent then he must be shown to be guilty, which is compatible with the default interpretation of the original sentence.
Both these logics can be understood as non-monotonically adding assumptions of the form 'Lp to theories expressed in an underlying monotonic logic. In the case of autoepistemic logic the underlying logic is classical logic, and additional assumptions of the form Lp also need to be considered explicitly. In non-monotonic modal logics, the underlying logic is modal logic, which, because it includes the necessitation rule of inference
P -LP
obviates the need to consider explicit assumption of the form Lp. In both cases, the standard semantics can be understood as special cases of a single, abstract, credulous semantics, formulated in assumption-based terms, which includes the stable model semantics [20] of logic programming and the standard semantics of default logic as further special cases.
The "innocent-unless-guilty" example illustrates the common feature of all these nonmonotonic logics, namely that they can be understood as adding assumptions to an underlying monotonic logic, provided the contrary cannot be shown. In the general case, however, the problem of showing that a sentence p cannot be shown is complicated by the fact that the attempt to show p can make use of other conflicting assumptions. Thus, for example, it is possible to have two conflicting defaults:
a person is innocent if not proved guilty, a person is guilty if not proved innocent or even a single conflicting default a person is innocent if not proved innocent.
It is the need to deal with such examples that accounts for much of the complexity of non-monotonic logics. In this paper we will investigate both credulous and sceptical ways of understanding what it means for a given conclusion to hold non-monotonically as a result of making certain default assumptions. The credulous approach justifies holding a conclusion if there is a suitably acceptable set of assumptions, extending the initial theory, from which the conclusion can be derived in the underlying monotonic logic. The sceptical approach, on the other hand, justifies a conclusion if it can be derived from all acceptable extensions of the given theory. The notion of acceptable extension can be understood in several different ways.
A se~n~ntics for default reasoning is given by specifying the notion of acceptable extension and identifying whether the approach is credulous or sceptical.
The simplest notion of acceptability, which in its credulous manifestation we call the naive semnatics, requires simply that the initial theory be extended with some maximal set of assumptions which is ca~~~ct-f~ee (in the sense that the contrary of none of the assumptions in the set can be shown using the notion of consequence in the underlying monotonic logic). This semantics generalises the semantics of Theorist [ 431, in which the underlying logic is classical, first-order logic.
The second, credulous semantics generalises the stable model semantics of logic programming and the standard semantics of default logic, autoepistemic logic and nonmonotonic modal logic. This semantics, which we call the stable semantics, requires not only that an acceptable set of assumptions be conflict-free, but that, together with the initial theory, it implies the contrary of all assumptions not contained in the deductive closure of the set.
The stable semantics can be given an argumentation-theoretic interpretation, which suggests other, improved semantics. We interpret a monotonic proof of the contrary of an assumption a! based upon an initial theory T extended with assumptions A as an argument against cr. Abstracting away from the detail of the actual argument and focussing instead on the assumptions d upon which the ~gument is based, we say that d attacks a. Under this interpretation, a set of assumptions is stable if and only if it does not attack itself (i.e. is conflict-free) and attacks every assumption it does not contain.
Viewed in such ~gumentation-theoretic terms, stable semantics is unnecessarily opinionated, taking a stand on every issue (i.e. every possible assumption either belongs to a stable set or is attacked by it), whether or not that issue is relevant to a given conclusion under consideration. The third, credulous semantics, instead, regards a set of assumptions as acceptable if and only if it is conflict-free and its deductive closure d@ends itself against all attacks (by attacking all sets of assumptions which attack it). This semantics, called the udmissibi~i~ semantics, generalises the admissibility semantics [ 101 of logic programming and arguably improves upon the standard stability semantics of default logic, autoepistemic logic and non-monotonic modal logics. The fourth, credulous semantics, called the preferential semantics, simply regards an extension as acceptable if it is maximal admissible, in the sense that no proper superset of the extension is also admissible.
The fifth, credulous semantics, called the complete semantics, is intermediate between the admissibility and preferential semantics. It regards an extension as acceptable if it is admissible and it contains all assumptions it defends.
As mentioned above, each of these credulous semantics has a sceptical version. We will see that, in certain cases, circumscription can be understood as the sceptical version of the naive semantics, where, as in Theorist, the underlying monotonic logic is first-order classical logic. We will also see that the welt-foun,ded semantics of logic programming is the sceptical version of the complete semantics, where the underlying monotonic logic is the logic of Horn clauses.
The rest of the paper has the following structure: Section 2 introduces the abstract framework and the naive semantics, equivalent to the semantics of Theorist [43] , and shows how different logics for default reasoning can be expressed as instances of the abstract framework. Section 3 investigates the stable semantics. Section 4 investigates the admissibility and preferential semantics. Section 5 investigates the complete semantics. Section 6 investigates sceptical semantics. Section 7 presents results about the existence of (credulous and sceptical) semantics and about certain conditions under which they are equivalent. Section 8 describes relationships to other argumentation-theoretic formalisms, Section 9 gives conclusions and points to some directions for future research.
Assumption-based frameworks and naive semantics
In this paper, a deductive system is a pair (C, R) where l C is a formal language consisting of countably many sentences, and l R is a set of inference rules of the form where LY,cxI,..., CY, E C and n > 0. Notice that logical axioms, cy, can be represented as inference rules with n = 0. Any set of sentences T 2 L is called a theory.
A deduction from a theory T is a sequence /It,. . . , &, where m > 0, such that, for all i= l,...,m, l pi E T, or l there exists ",...5njL in R such that cyt, . . . , a, E {/?I,. . . , pi-l}. P! T I-a means that there is a deduction from T whose last element is CY. Th(T) is the set {LX E L / T /-a}.
Notice that, because all deductions have finite length, every deductive system (C, R) is compact in the sense that whenever T I-a, then TO /-a for some finite subset TO of T. Notice, too, that every deductive system is monotonic in the sense that
Following Poole [ 431, we argue that the non-monotonic character of default reasoning arises because a set of assumptions that acceptably extends a given theory in a monotonic logic might not be acceptable if new sentences are added to the theory. Different logics for default reasoning can be understood as having different underlying monotonic logics, different kinds of assumptions and different notions of acceptability.
At a sufficiently abstract level, however, despite these differences, the different credulous non-monotonic logics can all be viewed as sanctioning a set of assumptions as an acceptable extension of a given theory if and only if, given the extension, there is no reason to believe the contrary of any assumption in the set. The notion of the contrary of an assumption is different in different logics. In the simplest case, we can understand the contrary of an assumption (Y as its classical negation YZ. However, other notions of "contrariness" are needed in other cases. is a mapping from Ab into C, where Z denotes the contrary of ar.
The theory T expresses a given set of beliefs, and Ab is a set of assumptions that can be used to extend T.
In the sequel, when there is no danger of ambiguity, we often omit reference to the underlying deductive system (fZ, R) and/or to the assumption-based framework
{T,Ab,-).
In contrast with an earlier formalisation ]6], we do not try to reduce the notion of contrariness to the notion of inconsistency. Nor, if the underlying logic admits the notion of inconsistency, do we assume that inconsistency implies every sentence of the language.
In this section, we consider the generalisation of Theorist's semantics, where the requirement that an extension be maximal consistent is generalised to the requirement that it be maximal conflict-free. We call this generalisation the raaive se~za~t~c,~. 
Theorist
Given a deductive system (C, R) for classical first-order logic, an abductive framework [43] 
Logic programming
We will assume, as is conventional, that the semantics of a logic program containing variables is given by the set of all its ground instances over the Herbrand universe corresponding to the language of the program. The Herbrand universe co~esponding to a given language consists of all ground terms constructible from the constant symbols and function symbols of the language. We use 3-18 to stand for the Herbrand base, i.e. the set of all ground atoms formulated in terms of the Herbrand universe. We use ?&,, to stand for the set (not Q j cy E 'W3) and Lit to stand for 7-M U 3-1&),.
A l R is the set of all inference rules of the form 7 Poole defines Ab to be a set of open first-order formulae and d to be a set of variable-free instances of formulae in Ab. fn our formulation, C and therefore A6 is a set of sentences (without free variables). Our formulation is equivalent to Poole's and more convenient for our purposes. whereaE~Ba~dp,,...,pnELitandn30;
l not LX = CY, for each not CY E 'M?,,,,. The interpretation of negative literals as assumptions in logic programming was introduced in ( 16,171, and formed the basis for the admissibility semantics [ lo], the stable theory and acceptability semantics 1281, and the ~gum~ntation-theoretic inte~retation for these semantics presented in [ 11,251.
Note that we could, equivalently, represent clauses as inference rules
In this representation, the theory is empty, and a logic program is represented by domain-specific inference rules of the underlying deductive system. This alternative representation highlights the similarity between logic programming and default logic (see Section 2.3).
Example 2.6. The logic program 7' {innocent + not guilty} represents the simplified "innocent-unless-guilty" example. In the corresponding assumption-based framework there are two maximal conflict-free sets of assumptions, Ai = {trot guilty} and A2 = {not innocent}. However, only the first, intuitively correct one is acceptable in all semantics for logic programming.
Therefore, the naive semantics is not appropriate to capture the semantics for logic programming. In Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6, we will define other abstract semantics that correspond to the logic programming semantics.
Logic programming can be extended, as proposed by Geffond and Lifschitz 1211, by allowing, in addition to negation as failure, a second, explicit form of negation, written as N. This negation can be used to define negative instances of predicates explicitly, instead of infe~ing them implicitly using negation as failure. Abductive logic programming [ 25, 261 is another extension of logic programming, where positive atoms can be explicitly indicated as assumptions and integrity constraints can be used to prevent unwanted assumptions.
Both extended and abductive logic programing can be formulated as instances of the assumption-based framework, following [ 1,6,12,25,26,56].
Default logic
Let (CO, 720) be a deductive system for classical first-order logic. Following l Ma = ~a. Intuitively, an assumption of the form Ma means that (Y is consistent, i.e. that ~a cannot be shown.
We will assume that the inference rules of first-order logic in 7+, are applied only to formulas in CO. This assumption together with the fact that the default rules in D derive only formulas in CO implies the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7. Let (T,Ab, -) be the assumption-basedframework corresponding to a de-.fault theory (T, D) . Then for each assumption Ma E Ab and for each set of assumptions A C AD
TuAl-MU if and only if Ma E A.
This lemma is important because, in general, frameworks which satisfy the property V/3 E Ab, T U A 1 p if and only if /? E A,
(called "flatness" in Definition 4.10) are guaranteed to have sensible semantics, as we will see in Corollary 4.11 and Theorem 6.2.
Example 2.8. There are several ways of expressing the "innocent-unless-guilty" example in default logic. Assume that the vocabulary of the language CO consists of the propositional symbols innocent and guilty.
( 1) Similarly to Example 2.5 of Theorist, the default theory is
T = {'guilty 4 innocent} ,
In the corresponding assumption-based framework there is only one maximal conflict-free set of assumptions A containing Mlguilty.
,...,M I, ' In Reiter's original formulation, default rules are expressed in the slightly different form "MP1y '
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(2) The default theory is
The co~esponding assumption-based framework has one maximal conflict-free set of assumptions as in representation 1.
The default theory in the first part of this example is a normal default theory [ 491, i.e. with all default rules of the form Poole [43] shows that there is a one-to-one correspondence between normal default theories (T, D) and abductive frameworks (T, Ab) in Theorist, where each normal default e in D corresponds to an assumption cy in Ab and vice versa. Moreover, under this correspondence, the semantics 1491 of normal default theories coincides with the naive semantics of Theorist. These results also follow from more general results we will present later, in Section 3.3. Let (C,R) be a deductive system where _L is a modal language containing a modal operator L, and R is some set of inference rules for classical logic for the language C.
The intended meaning of La is that LY is believed.
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In the corresponding assumption-based framework there are two maximal conflict-free extensions. One contains the assumption TLguilQ, the other contains the assumption Ilinnocent. Only extensions of the first kind are acceptable in the standard semantics of autoepistem~c logic, which we will investigate in Section 3.4.
Non-monotonic modal logics
Non-monotonic modal logics [ 391 can be formulated in terms of deductive systems of the form (_C, R) where G is a first-order modal language containing a modal operator, L, and R is some set of inference rules for the language LG. Different choices for R correspond to different modal logics. However, all R contain ali instances of the necessitation rule: " Given a theory T C C, the corresponding assumption-based framework is (T,Ab,-)
Example 2.10. Let T be the theory
This has the same two kinds of maximal conflict-free extensions as in Example 2.9 in autoepistemic logic, but cont~ning only negative assumptions. Similarly, only the first kind of extension, containing the assumption TLguilty, is acceptable in the standard semantics, which is an instance of the stable semantics defined in the next section.
In this example, the naive semantics for autoepistemic and non-monotonic modal logic coincide. More generally, for some choices of 'R, autoepistemic and non-monotonic modal logics coincide (e.g. see [ 531)) where for others they differ.
lo Here we consider the necessitation rule as formulated in 1391. However, note that in monotonic modal logics necessitation is restricted to sentences E E G that are first-order tautologies.
Stabie semantics
In this section we define the notion of stable semantics, which corresponds to most of the credulous semantics which have been proposed for default reasoning, including Theorist's extensions [43] If A attacks LY (respectively A') we also say that A is an attack against (Y (respectively A'). Notice that an immediate consequence of Definition 3.1 is that l given a set of assumptions A C Ab, if A is conflict-free then A does not attack itsetf.
However, the converse implication does not hold in general, because A might attack an ~sumption which is implied by T U A but is not in A explicitly, as iliustrated by the following example. If a set of assumptions does not attack itself and explicitly contains all the assumptions which, together with the given theory, it implies, then it is conflict-free. More formally: 
It follows imm~iately that
l a closed set of assumptions A C Ah is conflict-free if and only if A does not attack itself.
Note that a maximal conflict-free set of assumptions is necessarily closed. Assumption-based frameworks where all sets of assumptions are closed are simpler than other frameworks. In Section 4, such special frameworks are said to be flat (see Definition 4.10). The converse of Theorem 3.5 does not hold in general, as illustrated by the logic programming formulation of the "innocent-unless-guilty" example in Example 2.6. Here, the only stable set of assumptions is Al = {not guilty}. In fact, the (maximal) conflictfree set of assumptions 42 = {not innocent} does not attack not guilty.
The assumption-based frameworks for which the stable semantics and the naive semantics coincide are called normal assumption-based frameworks. The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for assumption-based framework to be normal. 
Theorem 3.7. An assumption-basedframework (T, Ab,-) is normal iffor each A C: Ab and each assumption CI $
Theorem 3.9. A closed set of assumptions d is stable if and only if A = S(A).
Proof. Let A be a closed set of assumptions. Then The notion of stable extens~o~z, i.e. of a theory 7'hfT U A) for some stable set of assumptions A, corresponds, more closely than the notion of stable set of assumptions, to the standard semantics of most non-monotonic logics, as we will see later in this section. Note that the set of assumptions contained in a stable extension is automatically closed.
The following theorem provides four alternative characterisations of the notion of stable extension. The theorem shows that the different characterisations differ prim~ily in the way they characterise theoremhood in the underlying monotonic logic. The first two characterisations are the simplest, because they take the notion of monotonic theoremhood to be already given. The second, in particular, corresponds to the standard characterisation of stable models in logic programming, extensions in autoepistemic logic and ftxed points in non-monotonic modal logics. The third characterises a sentence as a theorem if it is derivable by means of a finite number of inference steps. The fourth characterises the set of all theorems as the smallest set containing an initial theory (r i? AE) and cIosed under the operation of adding theorems. The fourth corresponds to the original definition of extension in default logic given in 1491, whereas the third corresponds to the equivalent characterisation of default logic as proved in [ 491. ( 1) E is a stable e~te~ls~on of (T, Ab,-j. (2) & (3) By definition of Th, E; is the set of theorems derivable from the theory T u AE by means of a deduction of length i.
(2) E=Th(TUA~),andA~isclosed. (3) E = Us Ei, where
l E, =TuAE, l for each i > 1 Ei+.l = Ei U {p E C / "2p3a4 E R and CYI,, . .
, (Y,, E Ei}, and AE is closed. (4) E = r(E) where for each set S C L, T(S) is the smartest set such that
(2) G+ (4) f(S) is the smallest set containing TU As and closed under theoremhood. Therefore r(S) = Z%(T U AsI and the condition E = r(E) is equiv~ent to E = ThjT u 4~) in (2). 0 3.1. Theorist Theorem 3.11. For any abductive framework (T, Ab) , the corresponding assumptionbased framework (T,Ab,-) is normal.
Proof. Suppose there exist A C Ab and cy E Ab, CY 6 A such that AU {ty} is not conflictfree. Then, because an inconsistency in classical logic implies any sentence, TU&J{a} I~a. Then T U A I-cy --+ -KY, and therefore T U A I-la, i.e. A attacks (Y. Therefore the normality of the considered assumption-based framework follows immediately from Theorem 3.7. q It follows directly from this theorem, from Theorems 3.5 and 2.4 and from Definition 3.6 Theorem 3.12. Given a Theorist abductive framework (T, Ab) , E is an extension of (T, Al?) in the sense of [ 
v and only if E is a stable extension of the corresponding assumption-based framework.
I;ogic programming
Given a normal logic program P, let (P, AD, -) be the corresponding assumption-based framework (as defined in Section 2.2).
By Theorem 3.10, equivalence between (1) and (2), E is a stable extension if and only if E = {q / P U AE I-q} where A E = {not p E Ab 1 p $ E}. Note that the condition that AE is closed is unnecessary, because every set of assumptions in such an assumption-based framework is closed.
Theorem 3.13 below states that stable semantics for logic programing corresponds to stable model semantics [ 201, defined in terms of Herbrand models.
A Herbrand interpretation I of a theory is any subset of the Herbrand base of the language of the theory. It assigns the truth value true to any ground atom in I and the truth value false to any ground atom not in I. It is similarly easy to show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between answer sets [ 211 of extended logic programs and stable extensions.
Notice that the notion of stable model (and similarly of answer set) is purely syntactic.
Extensions E are turned into models simply by restricting attention to the variablefree atoms or literals in E. This close correspondence between extensions and models suggests that there is no strong reason to prefer a model theoretic semantics over a purely syntactic one based on extensions. In fact, for our purposes, it is more convenient to deal with sets of assumptions than with extensions or models. This will become more apparent when we investigate the admissibility semantics in the next section.
Default logic
Given a deductive system (LO, 7&) for first-order logic and a default theory (K D), let (T, Ab,-) be the corresponding assumption-based framework with respect to (C, '&IUD).
Reiter [ 491 defines a set E C CO to be an extension of (T
, D) if and only if E = To(E)
where Fe is defined as follows: for each set S C_ La, To(S) is the smallest set such that 0 T c To(S), l To(S) is closed with respect to the first order deductive system (CO, RI)), and 
TUAs, C_ T(S'), a r( S') is closed with respect to the deductive system (L, R)
Now it follows directly from Theorem 3.10, equivalence between ( 1) and (4) A similar result holds for non-monotonic rule systems [36, 37] . Namely E is an extension of a theory T in a non-monotonic rule system (L, 'R) if and only if there is a stable extension E' of the corresponding assumption-based framework such that
This result follows directly from Theorem 3.10, equivalence between ( 1) and (3). The assumption-based frameworks corresponding to normal default theories are normal in the sense of Definition 3.6: 
t $ E)).
In the proof of the theorem we will refer to the fact that a consistent theory T can admit an inconsistent stable expansion. For example, T = {lLp} has the stable expansion E = {Lp, 'Lp, . . .} = L.
Theorem 3.18. A theory E is a stable extension of the assumption-based framework corresponding to an autoepistemic theory T if and only if E is consistent and is a stable expansion [40] 0fT
Proof. (+=) Assume that E is a stable expansion and E is consistent. We need to prove only that (I) {LX E Ab / --ILCY 6 E} = {La 1 a E E} and (2) (+) Assume that E is a stable extension of the assumption-based framework corresponding to T. We need to prove only that ( 1) E is consistent, and (2) (La E Ab 1 -?,!a $ E) = {La / a E E}, i.e. -La C$ E if and only if cr E E:
( 1) Otherwise E would not be a conflict-free extension and therefore would not be stable.
(2) But -La $! E, if and only if (since E = Th(TlJAE) and LIE is closed) ~LCY $! AE. if and only if (by de~nition of AE) CY E E. 0
Non-monotonic modal logics
Given a first-order modal language (C, 'FL) containing a modal operator L and a nonmonotonic modal theory T C C, let (T, Ab,-) be the corresponding assumption-based framework.
By Theorem 3.10, E is a stable extension if and only if E = 77z(T U A,) where AE = {lLa, E Ab 1 a $ E} and AE is closed.
The following theorem shows the correspondence between stable extensions and the original fixed point semantics for non-monotonic modal logics given in [39] : E is a fixed point of 7' if and only if E = Th(T U {ALLY / a g' E}).
In the proof of the theorem we will use the property, following directly from the definition of fixed point, that a fixed point E of a theory T is inconsistent only if T is inconsistent. Therefore, differently from the case of autoepistemic logic, it is sufficient to assume that the theory T is consistent to guarantee the correspondence between stable extensions and fixed points.
Theorem 3.19. A theov? E is a stable extension of the assumption-based framework corresponding to a non-monotonic modal theory T if and only if E is a fixed point of T and T is consistent.
Proof. (=+)
We need to prove only that T is consistent. But if T was inconsistent then E = C would not be a stable extension, since AE = 8 would not be closed. (G=) Assume that E is a fixed point of T and that T is consistent. We need to prove only that AE = {lLa E Ab 1 a @ E} is closed. Suppose that it is not. Then, there exists 1La E E such that 1La $ AE. But then, by definition of fixed point, if ~LCY $ AE then a E E. By necessitation, La E E. Therefore, E is inconsistent. This contradicts the hypothesis that T is consistent. 0
Admissibility semantics
Viewed from an argumentation-theoretic point of view, stable semantics seems unnecessarily restrictive, because it insists that a set of assumptions should take a stand on every issue. On the other hand, the naive semantics, which allows any conllict-free extension, is too liberal, because it allows intuitively unacceptable sets of assumptions. We need a semantics which is more tolerant than stable semantics and less liberal than naive semantics. Such a semantics, called the admissibility semantics, was introduced for logic programming by Dung [lo] . It provides a semantics in cases like those in Examples 4.1 and 4.2, where a stable semantics does not exist.
Example 4.1. Consider the logic program {P -not P).
This has no stable extensions. However, A = 8 is admissible in the intuitive sense that A is conflict-free and it is not attacked by any other set of assumptions. Moreover, A is maximal admissible, because the only larger set {not p} attacks itself.
Example 4.2. Consider the autoepistemic and non-monotonic modal theory 1-L s --) 7r, -Lt i Y}
This has no stable extension. In fact, if it had a stable extension E = Th(T U A), with A a stable set of assumptions, then either A would contain ~Ls and 1Lr or not. In the first case, A would attack itself and therefore would not be stable. In the second case, A would be unable to attack all assumptions not in A. However, both Al = {~Ls} and A2 = {?Lt} are admissible, because each is conflict-free and can defend itself against any closed attack. In particular, any attack against AI or 42 must contain the inconsistent set {~Ls, -Lt}. Any closed attack, therefore, contains both TLTr and -Lr, one of which is attacked by Al or AZ. It is easy to see that in any assumption-based framework whose underlining deductive system contains a notion of inconsistency such that inconsistency implies everything, admissible sets of assumptions are consistent.
Definition 4.4. A set of assumptions A C Ab is preferred if and only if A is maximal
(with respect to set inclusion) admissible.
As mentioned above, the notions of admissible and preferred sets of assumptions generalise the semantics for logic programming given by Dung [ IO] . This is expressed by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. For each logic program T and set of assumptions A in the assumption-based framework (T, Ab, -) corresponding to T, T U A is an admissible scenario of T (T U A is a preferred extension of T) in the sense of [ lo] if and only if A is an admissible (preferred) set of assumptions in (T, Ab,-).
This theorem follows directly from the characterisation of Dung's admissible scenarios and preferred extensions given in [ 25,261. Throughout this section, we focus our attention on admissible sets of assumptions rather than on admissible and preferred extensions. However, the restriction that admissible sets A be closed means that they are like extensions in the sense that, whereas extensions contain all the sentences Th(T U A) derivable from T U A, closed sets of assumptions contain all the assumptions Th( T U A) n Ab derivable.
Instead of understanding semantics in terms of admissible extensions or sets of assumptions, it is also possible to define semantics in terms of the ground literals in E = Th(T U A). In the case of logic programming, by assigning true to a ground atom p if p E E and false to a ground atom p if not p E E, we obtain a three-valued model of T. It follows directly from the result shown in [ 291, that there is a one-to-one correspondence between partial stable models [ 501 and models corresponding to preferred sets of assumptions.
It is also easy to show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between admissible and preferred sets of assumptions and the semantics of extended logic programs proposed by Dung and Ruamviboonsuk [ 141. The following theorem shows that preferred sets of assumptions provide a strictly more liberal semantics than stable sets of assumptions.
Theorem 4.6. Every stable set of assumptions is preferred but not every preferred set is stable.
Proof. Let A be a stable set of assumptions. First we show that A is admissible. Let A' be an arbitrary (closed) attack against A. Since A does not attack itself, it is clear that A' g A. Hence, A' -A is not empty. Since A is stable, A attacks A' -A. Therefore A attacks A'. So A is admissible. Since A attacks every assumption not belonging to it, it is clear that A is a maximal admissible set of assumptions. Hence A is preferred.
Example 4.1 shows that not every preferred set of assumptions is stable. 0
In general, maximal conflict-free sets of assumptions need not be preferred, as shown by Example 2.6, where the only preferred set of assumptions is {not guilty}. Moreover, preferred sets of assumptions are not necessarily maximal conflict-free, as shown by the following example.
Example 4.7. In the assumption-based framework corresponding to the logic program {p c not 4, q c not r, r t not p}
there is only one preferred set of assumptions, namely 0, which is not maximal conflictfree. In fact, the maximal conflict-free sets of assumptions are {WE p}, {not q) and {not r), which are not admissible.
However, the naive, stable and preferred semantics coincide for normal assumptionbased frameworks, as stated in the following theorem: (
1) A is maximal conj?ict-free. (2) A is stable. (3) A is preferred.
Proof. f 1) =+ (2) By Definition 3.6 of normal assumption-based framework. (2) + (3) By Theorem 4.6.
(3) + ( 1) Suppose A is preferred, but not maximal conflict-free. Then, A is conflictfree because it is preferred. Therefore, by Theorem 2.3, there exists A' > A such that A' is maximal conflict-free. Since (T,Ab,-) is normal, A' is stable. By Theorem 4.6, A' is preferred, thus contradicting the hypothesis that A is preferred.
Cl
The following theorem and its corollary guarantee the existence of preferred sets of iWumpti0ns.
Theorem 4.9. For eveq admissible set of assumptions A, there exists a preferred set of assumptions which contains A.
Proof. The set of all admissible sets of assumptions that are supersets of A is a nonempty partial order with respect to subset inclusion. Let do, Al,. . . , A,, . . ., where n is an ordinal number, be any increasing sequence of admissible sets of assumptions such that A0 = A. It is easy to see that this sequence has an upper bound A' = Ui>e Ai which is also admissible: if A' attacked itself then some finite subset of A', con&red in some Ai, would attack itself, thus contradicting the admissibility of Ai. Similarly, any attack against A' is an attack against some Ai. The admissibility of Ai implies that Ai and therefore A' counter attacks this attack. Therefore, by Zorn's lemma, since every increasing sequence of admissible sets that are supersets of A has an upper bound, then there exists a maximal admissible set of assumptions containing A. 0
It follows directly from this theorem that, if at least one admissible set of assumptions exists, then there also exists a preferred set. It is easy to see that if the empty set of assumptions is closed, then it is also admissible. This property holds trivially for flat frameworks, defined as follows: Flat assumption-based frameworks have a flat structure, in the sense that all assumptions are independent from one other. In general, in a non-flat assumption-based framework, an assumption cy can be implied by a set of assumptions A for one of two reasons:
l A is inconsistent with the theory, and in the underlying monotonic logic inconsistency implies any sentence, including (Y.
l a can be derived from A by means of the domain-specific theory, T. Implicit assumptions of the first kind can arise in Theorist, autoepistemic logic and non-monotonic modal logics and, as we will see later, in Section 6.2, in circumscription. Implicit assumptions of the second kind can arise in Theorist, circumscription, autoepistemic logic and non-monotonic modal logics, as illustrated in Example 3.2. However, it is easy to see that neither kind of implicit assumption can arise in logic programming and in our formulation of default logic (see Lemma 2.7 for default logic). Therefore:
Theorem 4.12. a The assumption-based framework corresponding to any logic program is $at. l The assumption-based framework corresponding to any default theory is flat.
However, the assumption-based frameworks corresponding to autoepistemic theories are never flat, since the set of assumptions {La, ALLY}, for any sentence LY, is inconsistent for any theory T. The assumption-based frameworks corresponding to Theorist or nonmonotonic modal theories may be flat in some cases, but are not flat in general. For example, the assumption-based framework corresponding to the non-monotonic modal theory is flat, while the assumption-based framework corresponding to is not. Although, arguably, it is an improvement over both the naive and the stable semantics, admissibility semantics can itself be improved, as the following example shows. 
{ -r + not s, Y + not t}
Like the theory T of Example 4.2, P has no stable extensions. However, unlike T, the sets A, = {not s} and A2 = {not t} are not admissible, because the closed attack A' = {not s,not t}, against both AI and AZ, cannot be counterattacked by Al and A?. Intuitively, however, AI and A2 are both "acceptable" because A' attacks itself and is therefore not an "acceptable" attack.
Two semantics, called "stable theory" and "acceptability" semantics, have been proposed for logic programming by Kakas and Mancarella [ 281, to deal with cases like the one in this example. These semantics can be generalised and defined more abstractly for any assumption-based framework. These generalisations are straight-forward, and we shall not discuss them further in this paper. A formal definition of these generalisations can he found in 1271.
Complete semantics
Once an agent commits itself to a set of assumptions A, it is not unreasonable to expect that agent to accept any further assumption (Y which is "defended" by A, and then to accept any assumptions "defended" by A U {a}, etc. Repeatedly adding such assumptions to a set A eventually leads to a complete set of assumptions, which not only contains A, but also contains all the assumptions A "defends". However, Corollary 5.8 of the following theorem states that in the case of flat assumption-based frameworks, every preferred set of assumptions is complete.
Theorem 5.7. Let (T, Ab,-) be a flat assumption-based framework, A C Ab be admissible and S C: Ab be a set of assumptions defended by A (i.e. S C Def (A)). Then A U S is also ad~liss~b~e.
Proof. Let A' = AU S. Since (T, Ab, -) is flat, A' is closed. First we prove that A' attacks every attack against it. In fact, each attack against A' is either an attack against A, which is attacked by A (since A is admissible), or an attack against S, again attacked by A (since A defends ,S). Finally we prove that A' does not attack itself. In fact, if A' did attack itself, then A' would attack either A or S. In the first case, since A is admissible, A attacks A' and therefore S. Since A defends S, we have that A attacks the empty set of assumptions, which is impossible. In the second case, since A defends S, A attacks A' -A = S -A. Again, since A defends S, we have that A attacks the empty set of assumptions, which is impossible. q (P Ab,-) 
It follows immediately that
corresponding to P P U A is a complete scenario of P in the sense of [ lo] if and only if A is complete with respect to (P Ab, -).
From the equivalence (proved by [ 81) between the stationary semantics [48] and complete scenarios semantics [29] of logic programs, it follows then that the notion of complete set of assumptions is equivalent to the stationary semantics.
Sceptical semantics
Until now we have focused our attention on various credulous semantics. We shall now investigate sceptical semantics. In general, we can define a sceptical semantics which accepts a conclusion if and only if the conclusion holds in every (credulously) "acceptable" extension, where "acceptability" is understood in terms of maxima1 conflict-free, stable, admissible, preferred or complete extensions. In this section we will investigate two sceptical semantics. The first is the sceptical version of the complete semantics, the second is the sceptical version of the naive semantics.
Well-founded semantics
The well-founded semantics of logic programming [ 601 is a sceptical semantics which accepts a conclusion if and only if it holds in all complete extensions. This leads to the following generalisation in our framework. Note that, because Def is monotonic (see Definition 5.2)) it possesses a unique least fixed point, which coincides with U{Def( 0) 1 i is an ordinal number}. If this fixed point is closed then it is (minimally) complete and therefore well-founded. This is guaranteed to be the case for flat assumption-based frameworks (see Definition 4.10) :
Theorem 6.2. For every Jlat assumption-based framework, the well-founded set of assumptions is minimal (with respect to set inclusion) complete and coincides with the least fixed point of the operator Def.
Proof. Since the framework is flat, 8 is admissible. From Theorem 5.7, it follows immediately that for each ordinal i, the set ~~~e~(~) j i 6 tz and n is an ordinal number} is admissible. Therefore, the least fixed point of Def, lJ{Def (8) / i is an ordinal number}, is admissible, and therefore does not attack itself (and is closed). Hence, it is complete and therefore well-founded. Cl
Therefore, for flat assumption-based frameworks, a well-founds, sceptical agent is willing to make default assumptions A but it is not willing to commit itself to d sufficiently to assume A in the course of defending A against attack. Rather, it restricts itself either to defending A without making any assumptions at all or to defending A with the aid of assumptions which can be justified without assuming A to start with.
From Theorem 4.2 it follows that the well-founded set of assumptions is complete for every logic program and default theory. Moreover, in the case of logic programming, this set corresponds to the well-founded semantics of Van Gelder, Ross and Schlipf 1601:
Theorem 6.3. Let P be a normal logic program and (P,Rb,-) the ~orrespond~~~g assumption-based framework.
Then A C Ab is well-founded with respect to (T,Ab,-) ij and only if {p 1 P U A I-p} U {up 1 not p E A} is the well-founded model of i?
This theorem follows directly from the results shown in [ lo] . Note that Theorem 6.2 gives a bottom-up method for computing the well-founded semantics of a flat assumption-based framework by computing u{Defi(@) 1 i is an ordinal number}.
The well-founded semantics is more sceptical than the semantics obtained by taking the intersection of all preferred or stable extensions, as implied by the foilowing Theorems 6.4 and 6.5 and as illustrated by Example 6.6: Theorem 6.4. For every jlat assumption-based framework, the well-founded set of assumptions is contained in every preferred set of assumptions.
Proof. Note that the well-founded set of assumptions is complete for any flat assumption-based framework and is contained in every complete set by definition. Moreover, every preferred set of assumptions of a flat assumption-based framework is complete, by Theorem 5.8. Cl
It follows directly from this theorem and from Theorem 4.6 that Theorem 6.5. For every JIat assumption-based framework, the well-founded set oj assumptions is contained in ever); stable set of assumptions.
Example 6.6. Let T be the logic program:
{p t-not q, q + notp, r + p, r +--4)
There are two stable sets of assumptions, {not p} and {not q}, which coincide with the preferred sets of assumptions. The conclusion r is justified by both of them. The well-founded set of assumptions, however, is 8, and does not justify r.
However, the well-founded set of assumption is not always contained in every admissible set of assumptions. In particular, the empty set of assumptions is always admissible for flat assumption-based frameworks, but need not to be well-founded. For this reason, the semantics obtained by taking the intersection of all admissible extensions is more sceptical than the well-founded semantics.
Circumscription
Whereas circumscription
[ 381 is usually defined model-theoretically, we interpret circumscription syntactically, in terms of sets of assumptions, when every model is a Herbrand model. This is the case, for example, when the theory T contains no function symbols and satisfies unique names axioms and domain closure axioms.
When every model is a Herbrand model, circumscription is the sceptical version of Theorist. Whereas in Theorist the set of assumptions Ab can be any subset of ,C, in our treatment of circumscription the set of assumptions Ab consists of ground literals (atoms and their negation) for predicates which are fixed and ground negative literals for predicates which are minimised.
More formally, let T be a theory in a first-order language C. Let P be a set of predicate symbols of C whose interpretation is to be minimised, 2 a set of predicate symbols of C whose interpretation is to be varied and & the set of remaining predicate symbols of L, whose interpretation is to be fixed. Ab = 7-B~ U 'IfB? U 'MB", where l IFlB, p is the set of all sentences of the form y(tr,...,t,,)
with p E P, l W3: is the set of all sentences of the l'orm with q E Q, l IFIB" is the set of all sentences of the form with q E Q, and tl,... , t,, are ground terms constructible from the vocabulary of C.
We will show (whenever every model is a Herbrand model) that a sentence (Y follows from the circumscription of T if and only if CY holds in all maximal conflictfree extensions of (T, Ab,-), where 3 = -p (so that conflict-freedom and consistency coincide).
In the standard formulation 
Existence, coincidence and uniqueness of semantics
In this section, we investigate two classes of flat assumption-based frameworks. We show that for the first class, stratified assumption-based frameworks, the well-founded semantics, which exists by Theorem 6.2, is also stable (and therefore preferred). Thus, for stratified frameworks, well-founded, preferred and stable semantics always exist, coincide, and are unique. We show that for the second class, order-consistent assumption-based frameworks, any preferred set of assumptions, which is guaranteed to exist by Corollary 4.11, is also stable. Thus, for order-consistent frameworks, preferred and stable semantics exist and coincide (but might not be unique).
Both classes of framework are characterised in terms of their attack relationship graphs. is not stratified, because its attack relationship graph has an infinite path: Proof. We need to show only that the well-founded set of assumptions is stable. From this and from the fact that the well-founded set of assumptions is contained in every stable set, it follows that there exists a unique stable set, which coincides with the well-founded set of assumptions. Let (T,Ab,-) be a stratified assumption-based framework and let A C Ab be the well- Inielligence 93 (1997) Assume the contrary. We will construct an infinite sequence of assumptions ao, . . . , a I,, . . , such that * for each i 3 0, ai if A and CX~ is not attacked by A, e for each i 2 0, there is an edge from LY;+I to LYE in the attack relationship graph, contradicting the assumption that (7',Ab,-) is stratified.
First, from the assumption that A is not stable, it is clear that there exists an crr~ $ A such that cya is not attacked by d. Suppose we have already constructed a finite sequence Qla,..., cy,, satisfying the above two properties. Then cy, $ A. Therefore, A does not defend CY,, and there exists a minimal A' such that A' attacks (II,, but A does not attack .4' -A. SO there exists Qi+l E A' -A such that ai+t is not attacked by A. It is clear that there exists an edge from cu;+_t to LUG. Cl There are meaningful frameworks which have a stable semantics but are not stratified, for example the framework corresponding to the logic program in Example 7.3. We will show that for the class of order-consistent frameworks, which contains this program, a stable semantics always exists.
We will call an assumption S "hostile" to an assumption cr if either it belongs to a minimal attack against cx or it is hostile to an assumption which is friendly to a. An assumption /3 is "friendly" to LY if p is (Y or /3 is hostile to an assumption S which is hostile to LY. An assumption S is "two-sided" towards an assumption LU if it is both hostile and friendly. Equivalently: Proof. Since every stable set of assumptions is preferred, we need to prove only that every preferred set of assumptions is stable. Let (7',Ab,-) be an order-consistent assumption-based framework and let A & Ab be a preferred set of assumptions which is not stable. We will construct an admissible set A0 containing A as a proper subset, thereby contradicting the assumption that A is preferred. Let Ab' = Ab -(A U {a 1 A attacks a}). Since A is not stable, it is clear that Ab' is not empty.
Let CY E Ab' be such that there exists no /3 E Ab' such that LY > p. (The existence of such a is guaranteed by the order-consistency of the framework.) Define SO (respectively St ) to be the set consisting of all those p E Ab' such that there exists a path with an even (respectively odd) number of edges in the attack relationship graph from p to cy. It follows from the definition of LY that So and Si are disjoint. Note that due to the definition of CX, LY E SO. Hence SO f 8.
Note 
Related work
The role of argumentation in human reasoning has been studied both inside and outside the field of artificial intelligence. Outside artificial intelligence, both Toulmin In this paper, we revert to the approach taken in [ 251 and developed further in 161 in which assumptions are taken as primitive and both attacks and arguments are defined in terms of the monotonic derivability of conclusions based upon sets of assumptions.
Kakas [ 241 generalised the argumentation-theoretic interpretation of negation as failure and applied it to other logics for default rezoning.
In p~ticul~, he proposed an argumentation-theoretic semantics for default logic different from the standard semantics and analogous to the acceptability semantics 1271 for logic programming.
Toni and Kakas [ 551 develop abstract argumentation-theoretic proof procedures for computing admissibility, weak stability [ 281 and acceptability semantics [ 271 for default reasoning in general and normal logic progranlming in particular. In the companion paper ] 131 we show how an abstract proof procedure for the admissibility semantics can be derived systematically from its specification.
Recently, a number of authors have investigated other applications of argumentation to logic programming, Kakas similarly develop an abstract argumentation-theoretic framework with the goal of capturing the semantics of many existing non-monotonic logics. They show that different variants of a single abstract notion of complete set of arguments corresponds to the standard semantics of default logic and autoepistemic logic. They also show a relationship to the semantics of stratified logic programs and the semantics of circumscription.
Their notion of complete set of arguments is similar to our notion of stable set of assumptions.
Brewka and Konolige [7] also investigate default reasoning at a similar level of abstraction in abductive terms, but without employing an explicit notion of argument. They propose a new semantics, which they apply to a variety of non-monotonic logics, and which they argue improves upon the standard semantics of these logics.
Marek, Nerode and Remmel [ 36,371 use their non-monotonic rule systems to provide an abstract framework to reconstruct the standard semantics of many non-monotonic logics. But they do not employ explicit notions of abduction or argumentation, and they do not consider the case of circumscription.
A number of other authors have employed argumentation for developing proof procedures rather than for semantics. Geffner and Pearl [ 191, for example, develop such a proof procedure for a conditional logic which has a sceptical model-theoretic semantics similar to circumscription.
However, the proof procedure is incomplete for this semantics. we conjecture that the reason for this incompleteness may be that the proof procedure computes the well-founded semantics instead.
Ginsberg [ 221 and Baker and Ginsberg [ 51 develop an argumentation-theoretic proof procedure for circumscription.
Like our argumentation-theoretic semantics of circumscription, their proof procedure is restricted to a case where arbitrary interpretations and Herbrand interpretations coincide.
Argumentation has become an important topic of research recently in the field of artificial intelligence and law. Prakken [46] , for example, extends default logic using argumentation-theoretic notions to establish a preference between arguments based upon priorities between different default rules. Prakken and Sartor [47] formalise similar notions using the language of extended logic programs augmented with priorities. They extend Dung's [ 121 grounded semantics, which is a well-founded semantics for extended logic programs, to incorporate such priorities. Kowalski and Toni [ 311, on the other hand, argue that priorities can be dealt with by expressing the assumption that a rule is not defeated by a higher priority rule by means of an explicit condition of the rule rather than by dealing with priorities in the semantics.
Conclusions and future work
The abstract argumentation-theoretic semantics we developed in this paper shows that most formalisations of default reasoning can be viewed as extending a given theory by means of assumptions. In each case, these assumptions can be understood as expressing that their contraries cannot be shown. In most cases, the existing semantics sanction an extension if it is maximal conflict-free or if it is stable in the sense that it attacks all assumptions not in the extension. Many of these semantics are credulous, sanctioning a conclusion if it holds in some acceptable extension. Others are sceptical, sanctioning a conclusion if it holds in all acceptable extensions.
We have argued that stable semantics, which is the standard semantics of most formalisations of default reasoning, is too restrictive and have proposed admissibility semantics as an alternative. As we have remarked earlier, admissibility semantics can also be improved by generalising the stable theory semantics [28] and acceptability semantics [27] for logic programming of Kakas and Mancarella. Admissibility semantics and its improvements have the further advantage over stable semantics that they can be implemented more easily by means of a natural refinement of the semantics. In a companion paper [ 131, we show how most proof procedure for such semantics can be derived from the semantics. For this purpose we formalise the proof procedure as a logic program and the semantics as a program specification. We use well established techniques for logic program synthesis and verification to derive the program from the specification.
We foresee three main research direction for the work presented in this paper: ( I) Other existing logics and other semantics for default reasoning can be investigated in argumentation-theoretic terms. In particular, it would be useful to determine whether any of the many existing proposals for improving the semantics of existing logics correspond to the admissibility semantics and its improvements.
(2) The abstract argumentation theoretic framework should be developed further with the aim of identifying other improvements. If possible, we should evaluate the different existing logics in argumentation terms with the aim of identifying the best features of the individual logics and incorporating them into a single formalism. (3) The argumentation theory should be applied to other problems of practical reasoning in areas such as law. We are particularly interested in the possibility that argumentation can help to reconcile conflicts between different sets of hypotheses. Some preliminary thoughts of this kind have been presented in [30] .
